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This paper explores the eects of human capital on workers during the latter 19th century
by examining the specic case of the U.S. Navy. During this time, naval ocers belonged
either to a regular or an engineer corps and had tasks assigned for their specialized training
and experience. To test the eects of specialized skills on career performance, we compile
educational data from original-source Naval Academy records for the graduating classes of
1858 to 1905. We merge these with career data extracted from ocial Navy registers for the
years 1859 to 1907. This compilation comprises one of the longest and earliest longitudinal
records of labor market earnings, education and experience of which we are aware. Our
results suggest that wage premia for \engineer-skilled" ocers rapidly deteriorated over
their careers; more traditionally skilled ocers were better compensated and promoted more
frequently as their careers progressed. This compelled those with engineering skills to leave
the service early, contributing to the Navy's failure to keep up with the technological frontier
of the time.
 Keywords: human capital, Industrial Revolution, naval history, tournaments
 JEL Codes: J24, M5, N31, N41, N71, O331 Introduction
This paper explores the eects of human capital on individual workers during the second
Industrial Revolution (roughly 1860-1910) by examining the specic case of the United States
Navy during the latter 19th century. This period is a critical juncture in our economic
history, for many modern skill-intensive technologies can trace their roots to the turn of
the 20th century (see for example Mokyr 1990, 2002; O'Rourke et al 2008). Understanding
the Industrial Revolution and economic growth in history requires us to understand the
interactions between human capital and technological change. For example, theories on
\unied growth"1 and \appropriate" technological change2 make precise, sometimes heroic
assumptions on how technologies and skills interact in order to better understand why so
many industries or economies fail to reap the rewards of industrialization. Without careful
study of specic personnel and the rms in which they work, we can only speculate over
these relationships, and theorize in a manner more ad hoc than we would like (Lazear and
Oyer 2009).
Unfortunately our knowledge of this period is limited; individual-level data on human
capital collected consistently over time are typically not available for any period prior to the
second half of the twentieth century.3 Arguably then, this is a great arena to explore the
historic role of technical skill, for navies have been both excellent indicators and creators of
a nation's economic and technological capabilities.4
In fact navies have typically led technological developments for the wider economy (O'Brien
2001). Instead the post-bellum Navy gives us an informative case study of an industry strug-
gling with technological transition. Specically, innovations in propulsion, hull construction
and ordnance increasingly raised the importance of \engineer-oriented" skills among naval
ocers; at the same time disgruntled naval engineers felt undermined and marginalized by
the profession (Bennett 1896, McBride 2000). At a time when engineering and mechanical
training was rising in importance throughout the whole economy, can we learn from the
Navy's ostensible schizophrenia concerning such training?
The analysis of the naval profession aords us a unique opportunity to understand the
role of human capital in a specic labor market during a period of uncertain technological
transition. During this time ocers played in separate \promotion tournaments" - each
ocer belonged to either the regular corps or an engineer-specic corps, with dierent duties
leading to separate career paths. Given these dierent tournaments, we ask a number of
questions. What kinds of technical skill correlated with naval career success? Did ocers
with specialized engineering training and skill fare better than ocers with more general or
traditional training? And how did career success evolve over the length of one's career?
We answer these questions by rst compiling data on naval ocers documented in the
1See for example Galor and Weil 2000, Galor and Mountford 2008, Galor 2009
2See for example Basu and Weil 1998, Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001
3The earliest example of a study linking individual schooling and experience data of which we are aware
comes from the Iowa State Census of 1915, skillfully exploited by Goldin and Katz 2000. Aldrich 1970 has a
very interesting study that tracks the earnings of West Point graduates during the ante-bellum period, but
not their educational proles.
4The person who mockingly named economics \the dismal science" would nevertheless have appreciated
gleaming broader economic insights from military history: \For we are to bethink us that the Epic verily is
not Arms and the Man, but Tools and the Man - an innitely wider kind of Epic" (Carlyle 1843).
1U.S. Navy registries. These registry books, arranged in annual volumes, chart the rank,
station and pay of every serving naval ocer over time. We match this data with the scores
these ocers earned in dierent subjects as students at the Naval Academy (compiled in
the Naval Academy registers) as well as data tracking the characteristics and stations of
the ghting ships to which each ocer was ultimately assigned each year. The nal merged
longitudinal dataset provides us one of the earliest examples of detailed individual measures
of education, experience and work performance of which we are aware. Furthermore, while
studied and discussed extensively by naval historians, this data has hitherto never been
codied, and thus has never been systematically studied.
Using these data we conduct some empirical exercises; these uncover a number of results
concerning the eects of skill on ocer careers. First, those with engineering skill tend to
leave the service earlier than those without. This is true whether we measure skill extensively
(comparing engineer ocers with regular line ocers) or intensively (comparing line ocers
with varying engineering ability). On the other hand, those with more \traditional" naval
skills tend to stay in the service longer. We suggest that a main cause for this was that
the Navy did not adequately reward those with \modern" skills and instead rewarded those
with traditional skills. Specically, we see that those on engineer-oriented career paths
earn relatively higher wages early on, but that these premia rapidly deteriorate due to
fewer promotion opportunities. On the other hand, regular line ocers appear to be on
a more meritocratic career path; there are more opportunities for promotion, and those
with higher orders of merit are promoted earlier and are \fast-tracked." Taken together,
the Navy's promotion tournament set-up does not seem to be ideally suited to handle the
forces modernization - its rigid payment structure undermined the relative earnings of those
individuals whose skills were in high demand in other industries, while rewarding those with
traditional skills likely to remain in the Navy anyway. This surely contributed to the Navy's
inability to keep up technologically, not only relative to other modernizing industries in the
U.S., but also relative to other major naval powers around the world.
The next section of the paper discusses the historic background in more detail. We then
describe the data collected and some of the empirical tests, and present our econometric
results.
2 Background
Depending on institutional arrangements or cultural beliefs, technological change can make
certain groups chary or cheerful, and can entrench or dislodge interested parties (Grief 2005,
North 2004). This can potentially threaten progress and lead to technological stagnation.5
The recorded history of the U.S. Navy grants us a fascinating look at an industry undergoing
technological upheaval. We can learn about the historic challenges of technological transition
in general by studying the Navy's workforce, its job and promotion structure, and its response
to the engineering-based changes occurring in the overall economy.
5After all, the promoters of the new technologies must rst \dislodge the entrenched, persuade the skeptic,
and reassure the fearful" before such technologies can be adopted (Mokyr 2005).
22.1 A Navy in Transition
The technological transition of the Navy was \engineering-biased"
The epilogue to the age of sail could be seen in the experiences of two burgeoning global
powers - Russia's experience in the aftermath of the Crimean War and the United States'
experience in its civil war (Smith 1937).6 Even before the Civil War growing reliance on
steam power was evident - in November 1860 Congress announced its plans to convert seven
of the navy's sailing ships to steam power, at a cost of $3,064,000 (Sweetman 1984). In
the meantime England, the paragon of all things naval, was rapidly transforming its navy
into one propelled predominantly by steam (Bennett 1896).7 In fact it appeared that all the
other leading naval powers were abandoning the old guilds of ship constructors for the new
engineering discipline of naval architecture (Barnaby 1960). A major reason for this was that
the global naval renaissance beginning in the 1870s was a switch in overall strategy, from the
guerre de course focus on commerce raiding and limited warfare to more ambitious guerre
d'escadre approaches of global power projection (McBride 1992). This of course meant going
up against the British, which required these naval powers to emulate their engineer-oriented
naval technology.
All this suggests that naval technical progress was becoming engineer-biased - that is, it
was raising the importance of engineers and constructors relative to their line-ocer counter-
parts in the modernizing eet.8 This kind of modernization required a new corps of ocers
that would function as inspectors and constructors of machinery (Bennett 1896). The tran-
sition underway was a big one - it required thinking of warships as an amalgamation of
machines (a \weapons system"), and this struck many in the U.S. as incompatible with the
warrior-ethos and aristocracy dear to naval traditionalists (McBride 2000). Indeed develop-
ments in steam propulsion, metallurgy, and naval ordnance was transforming the very nature
of naval professional life. Because of this many American line ocers viewed technological
advances as destructive rather than progressive (Coletta 1987).
The Navy marginalized and alienated these same engineers
An irony of U.S. naval history is that the Engineering Corps shared the privileges of rank
and status with regular naval ocers only in the ante-bellum Navy; as engineering skill
increased in importance after the Civil War, their privileges deteriorated (Calvert 1967).
This seems contrary to endogenous growth stories told in the \directed technical change"
literature, where \engineering-biased" technological transition should heighten the status and
privileges of engineers (Acemoglu 1998, 2002). Instead naval engineers continually protested
that they enjoyed neither the rights nor the duties to which they were entitled. Complaints
6The maintenance of blockades during the Civil War seems to owe much of its eectiveness to naval
engineers (Davis and Engerman 2006).
7Since the English shaped the naval technological frontier, the U.S. certainly took note in 1870 when
junior Lord of Admiralty Georey Hornby bid farewell \to wooden ships, to sails and yards, to the old
Navy of Nelson's time...henceforth came the era of steam and iron, of torpedoes and electricity; of what is
called Science versus the keen observation which gained every advantage possible to be taken from wind and
weather, and which used to be called Seamanship" (Smith 1937).
8See for example Griliches 1956, Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987, and Goldin and Katz 1998 for estimated
micro eects of skill-biased technological change.
3ranged from alleged pecuniary imbalances between engineers and non-engineers, as well as
non-pecuniary indignities such as lack of wardroom privileges, insucient living and eating
accommodations, and interference in engineering work by line ocers (Calvert 1967).
Much of the diculties for engineers stemmed from the anti-steam orthodoxy that erupted
from the wake of technological change.9 Many traditionally-minded ocers believed that
technological transition created a contamination within the \gentlemanly" ocer corps with
non-gentlemanly mechanics (Karsten 1972). Others feared the loss of control over weapons
and the means of propulsion; technological changes would require ocers to rely on me-
chanics, subordinating their role in core operations to a \non-aristocratic" engineer corps
(McBride 2000). Consequently naval leadership rigidly controlled the activities of those best
suited to lead the Navy through its technological transition, stressing instead their sub-
servient role. This was designed to \prevent the engineering tail from wagging the sea dog"
(McBride 2000).
Even Alfred Mahan, the celebrated champion of the big and technologically sophisticated
navy, dismissed the engineer corps as \those who snored away below while line ocers fought
the ship" (McBride 2000). Others referred derisively to engineers as \wipers" and \greasers"
(Coletta 1987). Perhaps in order to highlight the separate roles of engineer and line ocers
and to avoid further disharmony, a bill passed in 1871 which dened \relative ranks" for
engineers; these relative ranks were in eect until the Amalgamation Act of 1899 (Calvert
1967). The result was in eect to create a separate career path for engineers, one (as we will
see) with limited promotion potential relative to line ocers.
2.2 Naval Education and The Pre-Amalgamated Line
The Navy was divided between line ocers and sta (engineer) ocers
During the latter half of the 19th century nearly every new ocer in the navy was a graduate
of the Naval Academy. Always striving to be a mirror of the navy itself, the academy sought
to design a curriculum with the express technological and personnel needs of the naval
profession. The challenge was calibrating the proper mix of technical engineering courses
with traditional seamanship and navigation training. The primary debate was over the
question of whether all ocers needed to be engineers as well as sailors, or whether a certain
amount of specialization could take place between engineer and line ocers. Proponents
of the former approach included Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells, who back in 1863
rhetorically asked \whether every ocer of the line ought not to be educated to and capable
of performing the duties that devolve upon engineers."10
The Department of Steam Enginery was developed by Admiral Porter, Superintendent
of the Academy, to attempt to make all future ocers engineers as well. Blocks of academic
time were set aside for engineering instruction, and during the summer cruise of 1866 the
midshipmen alternated watches between the engine room and on deck. But this was an utter
failure from the start. The midshipmen showed very little interest in the engineering courses,
and their engineering performance on cruise was so abysmal that the approach was altogether
abandoned. Steam stayed in the curriculum, but the academy made no subsequent attempts
9See for example Morrison 1966, Calvert 1967, Buhl 1974, Albion 1980, and McBride 2000.
10Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1863.
4at qualifying all the midshipmen as engineers (Sweetman 1979).
As a result of both this failed experiment and the tensions among traditional ocers
and engineers, a heterogenous ocer core emerged, where line ocers and engineer ocers
performed mostly separate functions and competed in their own promotion tournaments. In
order to accommodate this specialization among personnel, the Naval Academy developed a
separate corps of cadet engineers who were instructed separately from the other midshipmen
during the last two years of their studies.
There were three phases during the 19th century when this was attempted. In 1868,
sixteen cadets were appointed acting third assistant engineers and began a two-year engineer-
oriented course of study. This program was discontinued after one year, but a new group of
cadet engineers was subsequently admitted. From 1872 until 1882 the academy consistently
graduated engineer ocers along with line ocers, oering them a \relative rank." The
Personnel Act discontinued this separate line of training, but it was resumed with the act's
repeal in 1889, and so from 1894 to 1899 the academy continued to graduate and commission
engineer ocers. Finally came the Amalgamation Act of 1899, whereby engineer ocers were
absorbed into a new \amalgamated" line, to be evaluated and promoted by the same criteria
as for line ocers. Thereafter all newly minted ocers were allegedly skilled enough to
perform any task aboard any vessel. This shift in organizational strategy was prompted by
a study made under the auspices of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.
The amalgamation ostensibly eliminated the independent corps of line and engineer ocers,
for according to Roosevelt \on the modern war vessel, every ocer has to be an engineer
whether he wants to or not" (McBride 2000).
Engineer ocers had incentives to leave the Navy; line ocers had incentives to
stay
We argue that the U.S. interbellum period of the latter 19th century produced many in-
centives (both \carrots" and \sticks") for naval engineers to leave the corps for alternative
pursuits compared with their line-ocer counterparts.
Of course the ever-shrinking size of the eet in the two decades after the Civil War
limited promotional possibilities for all ocers. By the early 1880s Annapolis graduates
took as long as eight years to make ensign (Sweetman 1979).11 Congress's rather blunt
solution to this imbalance was the Personnel Act of 1882, which stipulated that the number
of ocers annually commissioned could be no greater than the number of vacancies that had
opened up in the previous year. Those who were chosen to be commissioned were picked on
the basis of class standing. Those who were not received a diploma, a severance package of
$950, and an honorable discharge. Of the 305 Academy graduates from 1882 to 1887, only
136 remained past their second year of service. Although it is impossible to know exactly
who among these were directly aected by the act and who merely \were driven out of the
service by the discouraging outlook,"12 it is clear that the fortunes of all ocers in all classes
were tied to technological developments and naval funding.
Were those with engineering skills disproportionately hurt? This remains an empirical
question, but one could argue that while the Navy was treating engineering skill with hostility
11Ensign is the lowest rank for a naval line ocer, ranking just ahead of midshipman.
12NY Times article, December 7, 1892
5and relegating it to a mere trade, it was increasingly being viewed in other industries as an
important profession (Calvert 1967). An \engineering culture" spread across the greater
economy, marrying engineering skill with entrepreneurship, which paid well and attracted
engineers of all stripes (Goldstone, forthcoming). And mechanical engineers, as opposed to
their civil engineering brethren, were entrepreneurally inclined, and thus likely to join private
industry if it was considered more remunerative (Calvert 1967).13
Thus compared to regular ocers, engineers had greater incentives and opportunities
to pursue employment in alternative industries. For example, dozens were given temporary
assignments as professors at engineering schools - the great need for engineering education in
civilian schools compelled many to resign their commissions and become permanent instruc-
tors (Calvert 1967). Others sought more protable employment in private industry, such as
a number of naval engineers who, after demonstrating their technical skill at the Midwinter
Fair in San Francisco in 1894, were oered civilian machinist jobs (Bennett 1896). Further,
these engineers and constructors could more eectively engage in \reputation pooling" by
joining reputable rms and organizations with less hostility towards the engineer profession
(Brennan and Pettit 2004).
2.3 Delays in Technological Transition
The result of this technological wrangling coupled with separate ocer promotion structures
was a decline in the overall eectiveness of the service (Karsten 1972). The ocer core (and
by extension the Congress) was divided over virtually everything; questions over general naval
strategy, proper building materials for ships, proper metals for gun construction, and the
appropriate method of propulsion consumed naval dialectics for decades. These internecine
battles between the dierent corps only delayed the inevitable transition to a mechanical-
engineer oriented navy. The dilemma of course was that the construction and operation of
rst-rate ships would necessary privilege engineers and naval constructors; those who were
loathe to do to so became technological reactionaries, and as the Navy increasingly lled
with their ranks, progress stalled (McBride 2000).
Delays in naval technological progress are well documented. This delay was perhaps
most clearly embodied in the Navy's reluctance to abandon sailing techniques. In 1869 the
Navy Department directed the return of full sail power for all ships (Coletta 1987). After
this an awkward compromise resulted in new war vessels being equipped with both sail and
steam rigging, provoking Rear Admiral Thorton A. Jenkins to proclaim the eet to be a
\heterogenous mass of naval incongruity miscalled a navy" (Scott 1986). Shipbuilders were
forced to design vessels that would accommodate two incompatible propulsion systems, and
ocers were forced to familiarize themselves with both.
Technological compromise continued up to the turn of the century. The \ABCD" ships of
1883 (the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Dolphin), trumpeted for their steel hulls and steam-
powered propulsion systems as technological marvels and harbingers of a modernizing eet,
still incorporated traditional sail rigs. Even the USS Texas and USS Maine, commissioned
in 1895 as the nation's rst modern battleships, were designed to carry sails in order to
13In 1905 engineer Henry Towne went so far as to tell students at Purdue University that \the dollar is
the nal term in every engineering equation" (reported in American Machinist, July 20, 1905).
6complement their steam engines and extend their cruising radii (McBride 1992). The navy
continued to install both sail and steam technology on warships until 1904, when the USS
Intrepid became the last sail-rigged ship to be decommissioned (Coletta 1987).
A related area of technological uncertainty was the advance in metallurgy that allowed
the transition from wood to metal ships. Again, a smooth transition was thwarted by in-
ternal debate among top naval brass. Guided by the various factions in the Navy, Congress
contributed to the delay, which was generally unwilling to spend money on guns and warships
that would likely be obsoleted in a short period of time (Scott 1986). On the other hand,
many other congressional leaders held the antithetical but equally misguided viewpoint that
the eet consisted of highly durable and long-lasting vessels. John Ericsson, himself a cele-
brated naval engineer, proclaimed that \vessels like the monitors are good for fty years."
Such \false but soothing" advice failed to acknowledge that technological change demanded
constant military adjustments to military capital (Roberts 2002).
All this serves as a cautionary tale for industries on the cusp of modernization. The
suspicion held by traditionalists over steam powered vessels and the engineers necessary to
produce and operate them brought about the ebbing and outright decline of American naval
power, ushering in the Navy's \Dark Ages" (Albion 1980). Bradley Fiske, a line ocer
and inventor, testied before the Senate Naval Aairs Committee in 1908 that technological
advance was thwarted by the lack of appreciation for the engineer, and the failure of ocers
to \correlate the military and the engineering arts" and to understand that \relations ought
to exist between the two" (McBride 1992). The separate promotion structures only deepened
this divide. To glean further insight into this industry in relative decline, we look into the
fortunes of these two groups of ocers in the following sections.
3 Human Capital and Technological Transition in the
Navy
3.1 Framework
Given the history outlined above, we can consider the Navy as an industry with workers
embodied with two general types of skills - traditional skill and modern (engineering) skill.
Workers can embody both types of human capital, and technological changes can potentially
be biased towards either.
The workers we consider in our study are U.S. naval ocers. During the latter 19th
century, line ocers had more traditional skills and were engaged in a promotions tourna-
ment, while engineers and naval constructors had more engineering skills and were involved
in separate tournaments. As detailed in section 2.1, technological changes during this time
were clearly engineering-biased. Such changes would suggest that engineers and naval con-
structors became more valuable to the Navy.14 At the same time, one could imagine that
14The idea that certain skills can help in coping with technological change dates back to at least Nelson and
Phelps (1966) and Welch (1970), who suggest that education can yield higher returns in an environment with
more rapid technological growth. More recent studies such as Krueger and Kumar (2004) suggest that only
workers with \general" education can operate new, risky technologies, whereas workers with \vocational"
education are relatively more eective in operating old, established technologies.
7the traditional skills embodied in line ocers eroded in relative importance.15
This general framework however does not take into account the bureaucratic structure
of the industry, or the various struggles between the labor-types. Given the institutional
context, which kinds of skills actually thrived in this environment is the question to which
we now turn.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our basic empirical strategy is to test the eects of education and experience on various
measures of career performance. These include the length of service an ocer has in the
Navy (duration), the wages an ocer earns over a certain period of time (earnings), and the
probability that an ocer gets promoted (p).16
To get some idea of how education inuenced the length of ocer careers, we run the
following specication:
durationi = A + 
0x1i + i ; (1)
where durationi is the number of years ocer i is in the service, 0 represents a vector of
parameters, i is a random disturbance term, and x1i gives a subset of ocer i's human
capital characteristics. These can include an extensive measure of skill (engineer ocer
versus not), or intensive measures of skill (overall or subject-specic percentile scores earned
at the Academy, in subjects such as steam engineering, seamanship, ordnance and gunnery,
and navigation). x1i also includes the variable sicki, an indicator variable equalling one if
ocer i is on sick leave at any time during his service, and the variable leavei, an indicator
variable equalling one if ocer i is on leave at any time during his service. Finally, we
include dummies for each graduating class of the Naval Academy. Because the fortunes
of each graduation class varied dramatically (due to appropriation dierences year to year,
number of vessels year to year, and so forth), this is potentially an important control to
include.17
For our wage analysis, our basic empirical strategy is to test the eects of education and
experience on an aggregation of wages within a stylized Mincerian framework. We run the
following:
ln (earnings)i;rs = B + 
0x2i + "i ; (2)
where earnings is given by the expression
15See for example Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2000), who suggest that at least a portion
of human capital dissolves away with technical progress.
16Unfortunately we are unable to track workers once they leave the Navy except for the handful of former
ocers we have been able to track down from census records.
17Glaser and Rahman (2010) develop a fully-specied survivor framework to estimate the job separation
probabilities of these ocers. This requires a more extensive analysis using both experience and external
wage measures. Here we aim merely to establish some \stylized facts" concerning the relationships between
Academy education and career lengths. Nonetheless, our survivor analysis fully conrm the results of the





Here r is the chosen starting year and s is the chosen nal year of ocer i's wage
history. The dependent variable is thus simply a summation of annual wages for a pre-
chosen period of time. Because wages are documented only once a year in our data, we use
a summation of wages to get a more accurate estimate of what each ocer truly earned.
Further, pay dierences among ocers were primarily a function of dierent occupations
and ranks. The \schedule" of pay among the dierent ranks, however, remained remarkably
consistent through the period we are analyzing. Table 1 provides a portion of the schedule
of the annual wages paid to line ocers and engineer ocers during the late-19th century.18
18Other positions not reported in the table include the various ranks for marines, paymasters, naval
constructors, and even professors (these were typically instructors at the Naval Academy). These positions
also had specic pay schedules that varied according to rank and length of tenure.
9Table 1: Annual wages for selected naval ocers
and personnel in 1899 (contemporary dollars)
at sea on shore duty on leave or
waiting orders
Rear Admiral 6000 5000 4000
Captain 4500 3500 2800
Commander 3500 3000 2300
Lieutenant Commander
rst 4 years 2800 2400 2000
after 4 years 3000 2600 2200
Lieutenant
rst 5 years 2400 2000 1600
after 5 years 2600 2200 1800
Lieutenant junior grade (master)
rst 5 years 1800 1500 1200
after 5 years 2000 1700 1400
Ensign
rst 5 years 1200 1000 800
after 5 years 1400 1200 1000
Midshipman (cadet) 500 500 500
Chief Engineer
rst 5 years 2800 2400 2000
second 5 years 3200 2800 2400
third 5 years 3500 3200 2600
fourth 5 years 3700 3600 2800
Passed Assistant Engineer
rst 5 years 2000 1800 1500
second 5 years 2200 2000 1700
third 5 years 2450 2250 1900
fourth 5 years 2700 2350 1950
Assistant Engineer
rst 5 years 1700 1400 1000
after 5 years 1900 1600 1200
This pay depended on the type and rank of the ocer, the length of time he has been
at that rank, and his duty (broadly classied as \at sea," \on shore duty" and \on leave
or waiting orders"). In order to construct earnings proles, we match each ocer's type,
rank and duty station to the appropriate wage, constructing a time series of annual wages
particular to each ocer. To create a career earnings measure that varies among the ocers,
we aggregate these wages across time, ultimately capturing year to year variation in jobs,
ranks, experience, and responsibilities (e.g. command). If the ocer serves on a vessel during
a particular year, we cross reference information on the ship to which he was assigned - if
the ship is dry-docked, in ordnance, or otherwise incapable of being launched for sea service,
we allocate shore duty pay for the ocer.
0 represents a vector of parameters, "i is a random disturbance term, and x2i gives
a subset of ocer i's education and experience characteristics. Again, these can include
either extensive or intensive measures of education. To capture some measure of past work
10experience, we also include the number of years (out of a total of r years) ocer i spends
assigned to a naval vessel assigned to national waters (which we call \brown sea experience"),
the number of years out of r years ocer i spends assigned to a naval vessel assigned to
international waters (which we call \blue sea experience"), and the number of years out of
r years ocer i is in some command position (either of a vessel or a bureau). Here we also
include graduating-class dummies.19
One thing to point out is that for this exercise we can only count those ocers who
actually serve up to year s. If many ocers leave the service before that point, a selection
issue arises that biases results. To check for the robustness of results to selection issues, we




i;s = C + 
0x3i + i ; x3i  x2i (3)
where zi;s is an indicator variable equalling one if ocer i remains in service for at least s
years, i is a random disturbance term, 0 is a vector of parameters, and x3i is a superset
of x2i. Beyond what is in x2i, we also include in x3i an indicator variable equalling one if
ocer i had ever been sick or received naval hospital treatment any time up to year r of his
career, an indicator variable equalling one if ocer i had ever been on a leave of absence any
time up to year r of his career, and a measure of past external wages provided by Brown
and Brown (1968). These measures serve as potential predictors of early separation. The
sample rule is that earningsi;rs is observed only when z
i;s is one.
Ultimately this leads to estimates for the conditional expectation
E

ln (earnings)i;rs jzi;s = 1

= B + 
0x4i + i + "i ; x4i  x2i (4)
where i is the inverse Mills ratio generated from (3). Note that x4i is a subset of x2i;
this is because we only include ocer i's steam engineering percentile in x4i, excluding all
other subject percentile scores. This is to isolate the eects of engineering skill on ocer's
earnings, using all subjects to model the sample selection mechanism.20
Finally, by changing r and s, we can gauge changes in the relationship between human
capital and earnings over the course of one's career. This way we can compare how dierent
skills are remunerated over time. Using wages as one metric of career success, we can compare
across all the ocers in our sample.
We would also like to know how our skill and experience measures directly aect rates
of promotion. However because dierent career tracts have dierent promotion structures,
we can only compare line ocers with other line ocers, and engineer ocers with other
engineer ocers. Specically, after commissioning from the Naval Academy, line ocers
began careers as ensigns (o-1). From this, they could advance through the ranks of lieutenant
19While typical Mincerian regressions also include personal characteristics like age, gender, and years of
education, the ocers in our sample have little to no variability in these traits.
20As we will see in the results section, other subjects besides steam engineering do not signicantly aect
earnings, but can signicantly aect the length of one's service, making them ideal for inclusion in (3). The
variable sick does have some predictive power over earnings, but only very early in one's career. Glaser and
Rahman (2010) show that both sick and external wages are strong predictors of early separation.
11junior grade (o-2), lieutenant (o-3), lieutenant commander (o-4) and commander (o-5)21. For
a line ocer's rank wi, we analyze the probability of promotion using a reduced form ordered
categorical model. That is, the latent variable w




i = A + 
0x5;i + i ; (5)
wi = p ; if bp 1 < w

i < bp ; p = 1;:::;P   1 ; (6)
where the random disturbance  has a logistic distribution, 0 represents a vector of parame-
ters, and x5;i once again gives a subset of ocer characteristics. The ranges dened by b0 to
bP 1 represent latent value thresholds of the function in (5) necessary for ocers to achieve
promotions. When w
i < b0, ocers were in the lowest rank22. As w
i increased, ocers
passed thresholds b0;b1;:::;bP 1 and received promotions to the next rank.
x5;i includes Academy generated human capital (either as an order of merit percentile
or a dummy variable indicating the ocer was in the top 10% of his Academy class) and
human capital accumulated over time within the eet. Again this includes cumulative ship
experience in both international and national waters and cumulative experience in command
of a ship or in charge of a station. Additional dummy variables control for xed eects during
the periods prior to 1868, from the years 1868   1887, and for years after 1887.23
4 Data
We use data on naval ocers compiled by the Navy Register and housed in the National
Archives. Arranged by year, each volume contains the names of ocers, their rank, and
their duty or station. This information was compiled by the navy at the beginning of each
year (typically January or February). Figure 1 illustrates the number of ocers we track
through these registers, arranged by class year.
Each navy register also maintains a list of active naval vessels, their present duty or
station, and basic ship characteristics such as rate, number of guns and displacement. For
each ocer serving aboard a particular vessel we cross reference these ship characteristics.
This allows us to determine on what kinds of vessels the ocer served, and if he was in fact
out to sea as opposed to serving on a docked or uncommissioned vessel. Ocer assignments
and ship duties changed quite frequently, which introduces a great deal of job heterogeneity
21More generally, for regular ocers ranks range from admiral to cadet or midshipman. For engineer
ocers ranks range from chief engineer to cadet engineer. However, the denitions and ordering of rank for
engineer and other \sta" ocers uctuates from year to year, and a clear structure of rank comparable
across this frame of time does not exist.
22The \lowest" ranks increased as careers lengthen. For instance, the \lowest" rank for line ocers with
5 years of experience was ensign (o-1), while the \lowest" rank for line ocers with 20 years of experience
was lieutenant (o-3).
23Individual class eects are not identiable for these specications. The motivation for including these
periods are best described by Coletta (1987): \In consequence of the rapid demobilization of naval personnel
following the Civil War, wartime Academy graduates rose quickly in grade until 1868. However, the retention
of a number of wartime reservists and recalled regulars at the end of the war, the lack of a specied age for
retirement, and continued output from the Academy meant that a promotion `hump' persisted for the next
twenty years."
12into career paths and demonstrates how the Navy consistently moved ocers into new duties,
presumably at least in part due to dierences in human capital and performance.
In order to construct earnings proles for each ocer, we combine both sets of data.
Specically, we match each ocer's rank and duty station to the appropriate wage, con-
structing a time series of annual wages particular to each ocer. If the ocer served on a
vessel during a particular year, we cross reference information on the ship to which he was
assigned - if the ship is dry-docked, in ordinary, or otherwise incapable of being launched for
sea service, we allocate shore duty pay for the ocer.
Figure 2 illustrates the average earnings for certain graduating classes over time, both for
regular ocers and engineering ocers. As is clear from the gure, the economic fortunes of
each ocer were highly sensitive to when he graduated. A graduate of the class of 1870 for
example faced a crippling decline in commissioned war vessels, and so found his chances of
promotion limited. A graduate of the class of 1890 on the other hand was fortunate to have
a career during what now we can call a \naval renaissance." This heterogeneity compels us
to include graduating class dummies or period dummies for all specications. This allows us
to compare the eects of human capital on career performance for ocers who face similar
career environments.
We match merge this data on ocer duties, promotions and earnings to their Naval
Academy records. These records, housed in the Naval Academy archives, document each
midshipman's overall order of merit rank for his particular graduating class, as well as orders
of merit according to a variety of specic subjects. For overall order of merit, we compile both
freshman-year merit scores (arguably a measure of more general ability as freshman classes
tended to be less navy-specic and more academic, with classes like basic math and science,
English and composition) and nal-year (the end of four years) merit scores. Engineer cadets
were ranked along with regular cadets during their freshman year (since both groups took
the same classes during their rst year); during their nal year however engineer cadets were
ranked as a separate group. Each ocer i's overall Academy percentile is dened as
Academy percentilei = 1  
classranki
classsizei
so that scores are scaled from zero (bottom of the class) to one (top of the class). Subject-
specic scores are similarly scaled.24
The nal data set maintains the educational prole of every graduating ocer from the
academy from 1858 to 1905, and information concerning their service in the navy from 1859
to 1907.25 This is the earliest example of matched education-work experience data at the
24One issue we face in compiling specic subject information is the lack of exact comparability across
all subjects and graduating classes. For example, four-year scores on History and Composition, Grammar,
Rhetoric and Drawing only exist for the classes 1871 and 1872. Fencing was apparently deemed an un-
necessary skill for eective naval service and eliminated as a required course after 1875. Further, courses
were often changed around and renamed (for example, a "navigation" course could be labeled "practical
navigation," or "navigation and surveying," or even "astronomy and navigation"). We choose four primary
subjects to include in our specications, both for their high comparability across class years and for their
potential relevance for eective naval service; these are \steam engineering" \seamanship," \navigation" and
\ordnance and gunnery."
251858 is the earliest class for which we could nd information; our decision to end at 1907 is essentially
arbitrary.
13individual level in any industry of which we are aware, and provides us a glimpse into an
industry undergoing rapid and uncertain technological change during the latter 19th century.
The distribution of line-ocer ranks conditional on minimal years of experience appears
in table 2. From this we see a fairly wide distribution of positions.
Table 2: Density Across Rank (conditional on years served)
minimum years of service
rank 5 yrs 8 yrs 10 yrs 12 yrs 15 yrs 20 yrs
O-0 (midshipman) 4.31 - - - - -
O-1 (ensign) 56.57 32.63 26.00 11.86 - -
O-2 (lieutenant j.g.) 18.74 22.40 19.96 26.18 19.23 -
O-3 (lieutenant) 20.39 36.60 45.96 52.88 66.04 74.60
O-4 (lieutenant commander) - 8.38 8.08 9.08 10.24 18.37
O-5 (commander) - - - - 4.49 7.03
# observations 1393 1134 1027 936 801 626
Frequencies reported for line ocers serving from 1858 to 1902.
Descriptive statistics for line ocer covariates conditional on minimal years of experience
appear in table 3. Not surprisingly the cumulative experience variables each gradually in-
crease as years of service increases; however, the average time working in various jobs as a
percentage of total years served remains fairly constant across time.
14Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Line Ocers (conditional on years served)
minimum years of service
rank 5 yrs 8 yrs 10 yrs 12 yrs 15 yrs 20 yrs
ship experience (national water) 0.898 1.654 2.103 2.507 3.161 4.080
(0.914) (1.324) (1.488) (1.669) (1.964) (2.441)
ship experience (international water) 2.578 3.712 4.389 5.047 5.924 7.262
(1.020) (1.332) (1.614) (1.807) (2.078) (2.329)
command experience 0.017 0.046 0.069 0.085 0.171 0.430
(0.148) (0.248) (0.328) (0.394) (0.593) (1.002)
Academy order of merit percentile 0.507 0.516 0.519 0.521 0.529 0.527
(0.281) (0.280) (0.279) (0.277) (0.279) (0.281)
Academy order of merit top decile 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.087 0.090 0.097
(0.277) (0.278) (0.279) (0.281) (0.286) (0.297)
# observations 1393 1134 1027 936 801 626
Mean values reported for line ocers serving from 1858 to 1902 with standard errors in parentheses.
5 Results
5.1 Human capital eects on duration
We rst test the length of one's service in the navy by regressing the number of years of
service on measures of skill and ability, as specied in (1). This requires right-censored
regressions, as we have navy register information only up to 1907, while many ocers in our
dataset serve in the navy well beyond that point.26 We also exclude from the sample here
any ocer who dies while in service (alternatively, including a dummy variable indicating
death while in the Navy does not alter any results).
26For the graduates of the class of 1904, for example, the dependent variable can take values of 1 or 2
(the uncensored cases) or 3 (the censored case). Thus censored points will be class-dependent. The ocer
graduating in 1904 who lasts for at three years is thus top coded.
15Table 4: Right-censored estimates of eects of education
on career length (all personnel excluding those who
die in service)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6
Academy percentile - 8.5*** - - 8.2** -
(1.4) (4.1)
rst-year percentile - - 5.3*** - - 1.3
(1.5) (2.0)
steam percentile - - - -4.1* -5.9** -4.8**
(2.3) (2.4) (2.4)
seamanship percentile - - - 5.6*** 3.5 5.4**
(2.1) (2.3) (2.3)
navigation percentile - - - 8.2*** 5.1** 8.4***
(2.4) (2.8) (2.6)
ordnance percentile - - - 3.2 0.82 1.7
(2.7) (2.9) (2.8)
engineer (dummy) -0.14 -0.43 -0.05 - - -
(1.4) (1.4) (1.6)
sick (dummy) -5.2*** -5.3*** -5.2*** -3.7*** -3.8*** -3.7**
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.6)
leave (dummy) 4.8*** 4.6*** 4.0*** 6.1*** 6.0*** 5.6***
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
observations 2125 2114 1970 1604 1598 1518
right-censored observations 1092 1090 1068 887 885 881
pseudo-R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
Dependent variable is number of years of naval ocer's career (up to 1907).
Constant and class dummies not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
16Table 5: Right-censored estimates of eects of education on
career length (all personnel excluding those who
die in service and/or serve fewer than three years)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6
Academy percentile - 1.6 - - 2.2 -
(1.6) (5.1)
rst-year percentile - - 0.24 - - -1.4
(1.7) (2.5)
steam percentile - - - -5.9** -6.3** -7.0***
(3.0) (3.2) (3.0)
seamanship percentile - - - 5.2* 4.4 5.8**
(2.8) (3.0) (2.9)
navigation percentile - - - 5.4* 4.6 6.1**
(3.0) (3.5) (3.1)
ordnance percentile - - - -1.4 -1.9 -2.3
(3.4) (3.6) (3.5)
engineer (dummy) -3.3** -3.3** -4.0** - - -
(1.5) (1.5) (1.8)
sick (dummy) -8.6*** -8.6*** -8.4*** -7.8*** -7.9*** -7.8***
(1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.7) (1.7) (1.8)
leave (dummy) 0.43 0.42 -0.51 1.4 1.4 0.23
(1.2) (1.2) (1.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5)
observations 1687 1684 1574 1219 1216 1163
right-censored observations 983 981 959 778 776 772
pseudo-R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Dependent variable is number of years of naval ocer's career (up to 1907).
Constant and class dummies not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
17Tables 4 and 5 present our rst set of results. We see in Table 4, which includes all
living personnel, that line ocers with greater engineering skill leave early, while those with
navigation and seamanship skill stay longer. This makes sense, since engineering skill was
likely to be far more transferable to other industries than seamanship or navigation. We
further know that those line-ocers gifted in engineering were more likely to become naval
constructors - this was a group held in contempt by many line ocers, which may have
further motivated their departure. Finally we see that overall merit has a strong positive
eect on duration of service.
One complication here however is that the Personnel Act of 1882 forced the navy to
discharge many midshipmen throughout the 1880s; further, as we mention in the previous
section, this decision was made primarily on the basis of overall merit. This creates a great
many number of small observations for the dependent variable and overestimates the eects
of Academy percentile. In order to address this we rerun the same specication, but limit our
observations only to those who serve at least for three years, losing roughly 400 observations.
These ocers would not have been directly aected by the Personnel Act. Results are
reported in Table 5. Coecients for Academy percentile fall to insignicance but remain
positive. However, now we observe a statistically signicant negative eect on duration for
both extensive and intensive measures of engineering skill. The more engineer-gifted ocers
tended to leave the service a good few years ahead of the rest; the more \traditionally"
skilled on the other hand tended to remain in the service longer. It is important to note that
the overwhelming majority of those ocers who leave the service do so voluntarily, in that
they are characterized as having \resigned" or \retired" (as opposed to being \dismissed"
or \discharged"). Thus we feel condent in suggesting that these ocers \voted with their
feet" in exiting the service.27
The next sections attempt to empirically explore why ocers with dierent skills left the
service at dierent points in their careers.
5.2 Human capital eects on earnings across all ocers
We regress the logged earnings ocers received over a certain interval of their careers on
individual measures of education obtained at the Naval Academy and ship experience from
past naval service (specication 2). We consider year r the rst year of their earnings history,
and year s the last year of this history. Specically, Table 6 has r = 3 and s = 7, so that
we estimate the eects of education and the rst two years of experience on ve subsequent
years of earnings. Table 7 sets r = 3 and s = 12, so that we estimate the eects of education
and the rst two years of experience on ten subsequent years of earnings.
27We also run a number of alternative specications (not reported). First, when we exclude those who die
in service from the sample, our results remain virtually the same. Next, we include quadratics for the skill
terms; these non-linear terms do not come in as signicant. Finally, we introduce interaction terms between
cohort dummies and subject performance measures to gauge potential changes in course content over time.
In each case the overall skill measure fall to insignicance; however, the steam interaction terms are all
negative with the majority of them statistically signicant, while the seamanship and navigation interaction
terms are mostly positive with many of these being signicant, albeit with no discernible pattern.
18Table 6: OLS and Heckit estimates of eects of education
and experience on earnings (r = 3, s = 7)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Academy perc. 0.085*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04 0.087*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.015) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.016) (0.02) (0.02)
rst-year perc. - 0.04*** - 0.025 - 0.04*** - 0.02
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.02)
steam perc. - - 0.04** 0.04** - - 0.05*** 0.045**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.019) (0.02)
seamanship perc. - - 0.003 0.01 - - - -
(0.02) (0.02)
navigation perc. - - 0.01 0.009 - - - -
(0.02) (0.02)
ordnance perc. - - -0.003 0.004 - - - -
(0.02) (0.02)
blue sea exp. -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.082*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09***
(0.01) (0.015) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
brown sea exp. -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.076*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.015) (0.02) (0.015) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
command exp. 0.01 0.013 -0.02 -0.015 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
engineer (dummy) 0.27*** 0.30*** - - 0.26*** 0.30*** - -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.015)
(Acad.perc.)*(eng.) -0.03 -0.04 - - -0.03 -0.03 - -
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
mills - - - - 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
obs. 1381 1271 965 904 2358 2248 1761 1700
censored obs. - - - - 977 977 796 796
R2 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.85 - - - -
OLS estimates yes yes yes yes no no no no
Heckit estimates no no no no yes yes yes yes
Dependent variable is the logged sum of annual earnings from year 3 to year 7 of
naval ocer's career.
OLS estimates include only observations on those ocers who serve at least 7 years.
Constant and class dummies not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
19Table 7: OLS and Heckit estimates of eects of education
and experience on earnings (r = 3, s = 12)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Academy perc. 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.064*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.014) (0.02) (0.02)
rst-year perc. - 0.02** - 0.02 - 0.02** - 0.02
(0.01) (0.015) (0.01) (0.015)
steam perc. - - 0.04** 0.045** - - 0.04** 0.04**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
seamanship perc. - - 0.0002 0.004 - - - -
(0.01) (0.01)
navigation perc. - - 0.008 0.01 - - - -
(0.01) (0.015)
ordnance perc. - - -0.01 -0.007 - - - -
(0.02) (0.02)
blue sea exp. -0.03*** -0.034** -0.02* -0.02 -0.015 -0.015 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
brown sea exp. -0.02** -0.027** -0.01 -0.015 -0.002 -0.01 -0.007 -0.007
(0.01) (0.015) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
command exp. -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.075 -0.076 -0.08 -0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.015) (0.015) (0.12) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09)
engineer (dummy) 0.22*** 0.28*** - - 0.21*** 0.27*** - -
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
(Acad.perc.)*(eng.) -0.06 -0.03 - - -0.07** -0.045 - -
(0.05) (0.06) (0.035) (0.04)
mills - - - - 0.11*** 0.088*** 0.055* 0.06*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.035)
obs. 1015 927 711 665 2358 2270 1761 1715
censored obs. - - - - 1343 1343 1050 1050
R2 0.88 0.88 0.9 0.88 - - - -
OLS estimates yes yes yes yes no no no no
Heckit estimates no no no no yes yes yes yes
Dependent variable is the logged sum of annual earnings from year 3 to year 12 of
naval ocer's career.
OLS estimates include only observations on those ocers who serve at least 12 years.
Constant and class dummies not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20Note that for these results we only include ocers who lasted at least s years in the
service (so that we always measure s years worth of earnings for each ocer). This however
creates a selection bias, so we alternatively produce Heckit estimates (specication 4). Both
tables include both OLS and Heckit estimates.
Academy percentile generally shows up as positive and signicant. We can see from our
5-year measures that someone who graduates from the top of his class is predicted to earn
roughly 6% to 9% more over a 5 year stretch of time compared to someone who graduates at
the bottom of his class. First year relative merit, arguably a better gauge of innate general
intelligence, seems to echo this. Interestingly, engineers with high Academy scores do not
earn higher wages (captured by the Academy score-engineer dummy cross term) - it seems
that the pecuniary benets from having a high Academy order of merit fail to materialize
on the engineer career path.
We also include subject specic ability measures. Engineering ability, as captured by
scores in steam engineering classes, pays a premium early in one's career. Someone gradu-
ating at the top of their class in engineering makes somewhere between 4 to 5% more than
someone at the bottom of the class over a 5-year period (depending on the specication).
28 Interestingly, steam performance is the only specic subject that generates a measurable
premia for line ocers.29
We can also see that engineer ocers (no matter what their Academy standing) were paid
a sizable premium; they received around 25 to 30% more over 5 years relative to line ocers.
Note that while most historical studies of wage premia can not control for innate ability, we
can do so here. Specically, we include rst-year relative merit scores, which compare all the
ocers together. This also addresses another selection issue - the possibility that engineer
ocers were just smarter than regular line ocers. We account for this in specications 2
and 6 (testing this extensive measure of engineering skill), which include the rst-year order
of merit as an additional explanatory variable.
5.3 Relative wage declines
This gives us a sense of the magnitude of wage premia, both for more general skills and
engineering skills (intensively and extensively measured). However, this gives us only a
snapshot: to gauge how these premia change over the course of ocers' careers, we simply
increase r and s by yearly increments, and re-run all specications. What we nd is that
engineering-premia decline over the early part of one's career, but has the potential to rise
much later in one's career. Figures 3 and 4 display these results (for both 5 and 10 year
stretches of earnings).30 We dot those estimates that are statistically signicant, include
bands indicating two standard deviations from each estimate, and include 2nd-order poly-
nomial trend-lines that highlight this non-monotonic relationship between relative earnings
and engineering skill.
For at least the rst two decades of an engineer-ocer's career, his wage premium falls
28Not included are other subject areas, such as physical science, political science and foreign languages.
None of these came in as statistically signicant or altered any of the other results.
29We also try each specic subject one by one as well as subject-cohort eects; these terms do not show
any signicance.
30For example: notice how s   r   1 = 5 for gure 3, while s   r   1 = 10 for gure 4.
21over time. From earning 25-30% more than his line-ocer counterpart, he earns less than
10% more than twenty years later. And line ocers who score at the top of their class in
engineering earn roughly a 5% premium at the start of their careers but end up earning
a negative return after twenty years or so (although this nding is not statistically signi-
cant). At a time when engineer skills should have been of greater value to the Navy, they
commanded less and less of a return for most ocers over time.
The general cause for these declines was the lack of promotion opportunities in the engi-
neer promotions tournaments. The engineer and naval construction corps had few windows
for advancement (typically going from \assistant" to \passed assistant" to \chief"). While
each promotion was accompanied by a large salary increase, these promotions were rarely
granted. Line ocers of course made similar complaints over their lack of advancement op-
portunities. Here we demonstrate that in fact things were worse for engineers (see Lazear
and Rosen 1981 on how the lack of promotion windows in tournaments can hurt both worker
eort and morale). However, if engineers stuck it out and forged a true naval career for
themselves, their relative earnings scenario eventually improved. How was this possible? As
it happens, at this point many engineer ocers were able to switch into the line ocer tour-
nament! That is, instead of becoming chief engineers, many were absorbed into the regular
line and become lieutenant commanders. These engineers from the Academy classes of the
early to mid 1870s saw their relative earnings steadily improve as they competed against
regular members of the ocer corps. Of course by then many erstwhile naval engineers and
constructors had already left for better opportunities in other industries.31 The relative wage
declines of engineer-tracked ocers during the formative part of their careers induced many
to resign their commissions, during a period of engineer-biased technological transition.32
5.4 Promotions among line ocers
Finally we look to the determinants that aect the promotion of line ocers. Table 8 reports
estimates from the ordered logit specication outlined in (5) that controls for Academy order
of merit as a percentile ranking. Table 9 controls for career `fast-tracking' of midshipman
who nished in the top 10% of their Academy class as theoretically discussed in Bernhardt
(1995). Results remain robust across both specications - higher order of merit implies faster
promotion. When we perform this exercise for engineer ocers, we nd no positive eect
of rankings on promotions (results not reported). And as demonstrated in tables 6 and 7,
engineers with higher Academy scores do not earn more than those with low scores, while
there is a positive earnings eects for line ocers with high scores. The implication is clear
- the regular line was a more meritocratic organization than the engineering corps in that
higher ability ocers were promoted more rapidly, another reason to suspect that talented
engineers left the Navy with greater frequency.
31Empirically we see that engineers exit the service mainly during the rst two decades of their careers.
We rerun (1), once only for those who serve between 3 and 20 years, and again only for those who serve for
at least 20 years. The coecient on the engineer dummy is strongly negative and statistically signicant in
the former specication, while it falls to insignicance in the latter (results not reported).
32We can look to the analysis of Frank (1985) to suggest that engineers had to be paid more than line
ocers to compensate for the diminished stature they endured in naval service. As income dierentials
narrowed the compensation needed to retain these engineers eroded away.
22Note also the role played by cumulative eet experience on promotions. In particular,
serving on any type of ship had a slight positive eect on promotion likelihoods earlier in a
career. The type of service (international or national) does not appear to matter, only that
an ocer served on a ship. This eect diminishes over time as careers advanced beyond 15
years and even has a negative relationship for ocers by their 20th year. Indeed, ocers
who spent too much time at sea especially without command experience stagnated in their
careers with fewer promotions. This makes some sense, as those who demonstrate capability
are often moved o of vessels and out of engine rooms and into oce positions which focus
on leadership and strategy.
In contrast to this, command experience demonstrates a positive eect on promotions,
a result which does not diminish over time. Achieving command serves as a gateway to
better jobs later in a career, mitigating or perhaps preventing an ocer from languishing
on ships his entire career. Using estimates reported in table 9, the ceteris paribus predicted
probability of achieving specic grades conditional on command experience is shown in table
10. Most notably, this demonstrates how any command experience insulated ocers from
stagnating in the lowest grades. While most ocers (but not all) reached at least lieutenant
by year 8, ocers with any command experience never ranked lower than a lieutenant.
After 15 year careers, the impact of command experience remained positive, albeit not quite
as strong. After the initial round of sorting that occurred in the rst 8 years, command
experience had a dwindling eect. As it became more common for ocers to achieve some
command experience later in their careers, its value as a sorting mechanism for promotions
commensurately became diluted.
Table 9 reports results using a dummy variable for ocers who graduated in the top 10%
of their Academy class. This essentially serves as a proxy variable to indicate ocers slotted
onto a `fast-track' promotion path upon graduation (Bernhardt 1995, Gibbons and Waldman
1999). Notably the estimated eects on promotions of nishing in the top 10% remain fairly
consistent across the span of careers with only mild uctuations. The statistical signicance
of these coecients diminishes, however, as time away from the original signal lengthens and
standard errors increase.
The overall picture suggests that line ocers were rewarded for their human capital. Both
education at the Academy and experience in the Navy are powerful predictors for promotion.
The same cannot be said for engineers or naval constructors. The bureaucratic structure of
the Navy thus incentivized those with more traditional skills to stay in the Navy and those
with engineering skills to leave.
23Table 8: Ordered logit with academy performance as percentile
(USNA line ocers, classes of 1858-1902)
VARIABLES year 5 year 8 year 10 year 12 year 15 year 20
ship experience (national water) 0.167 0.272*** 0.241*** 0.161*** -0.007 -0.142***
(0.189) (0.079) (0.050) (0.060) (0.070) (0.055)
ship experience (international water) 0.111 0.129 0.218*** 0.183*** 0.079 -0.056
(0.152) (0.079) (0.057) (0.062) (0.067) (0.061)
command experience 0.072 1.553*** 0.827** 0.289 0.302*** 0.447***
(0.169) (0.453) (0.344) (0.199) (0.086) (0.114)
Academy percentile 0.729*** 0.315* 0.376 0.720** 0.760** 1.035**
(0.272) (0.161) (0.259) (0.314) (0.382) (0.447)
Academy class (1868-1887) -4.915*** -4.275*** -4.733*** -5.659*** -4.035*** -2.490**
(1.280) (1.434) (1.726) (1.058) (0.679) (1.017)
Academy class (1888- ) -5.490*** -3.167** -2.376* -2.522*** -0.135 -
(1.294) (1.329) (1.365) (0.781) (0.920)
o0-o1 cut -7.249*** - - - - -
(1.532)
o1-o2 cut -3.118*** -3.161*** -3.360*** -5.387*** - -
(1.489) (1.529) (1.774) (0.986)
o2-o3 cut -0.827 -1.845 -2.014 -3.358*** -3.987*** -
(0.937) (1.365) (1.602) (0.879) (0.718)
o3-o4 cut - 2.030*** 2.711*** 2.583*** 1.520 -0.636
(0.764) (0.801) (0.829) (0.925) (1.369)
o4-o5 cut - - - - 3.054*** 1.393
(0.994) (1.293)
observations 1393 1134 1026 936 801 626
number of categories 4 4 4 4 4 3
pseudo-R2 0.320 0.212 0.252 0.276 0.212 0.226
2 27.61 70.02 60.81 48.03 102.9 44.95
Coecient estimates reported with standard errors clustered by USNA class year in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
24Table 9: Ordered Logit with academy performance as top decile
(USNA line ocers, classes of 1858-1902)
VARIABLES year 5 year 8 year 10 year 12 year 15 year 20
ship experience (national water) 0.163 0.275*** 0.243*** 0.147** -0.020 -0.152***
(0.191) (0.065) (0.053) (0.059) (0.070) (0.056)
ship experience (international water) 0.110 0.130* 0.218*** 0.173*** 0.068 -0.065
(0.152) (0.076) (0.058) (0.059) (0.068) (0.058)
command experience 0.055 1.545*** 0.827** 0.257 0.286*** 0.441***
(0.175) (0.454) (0.346) (0.195) (0.092) (0.116)
Academy top decile 0.520*** 0.445*** 0.472** 0.634*** 0.435 0.514
(0.168) (0.147) (0.230) (0.243) (0.355) (0.378)
Academy class (1868-1887) -4.886*** -4.276*** -4.742*** -5.636*** -4.010*** -2.448**
(1.263) (1.432) (1.726) (1.045) (0.676) (1.030)
Academy class (1888- ) -5.478*** -3.158*** -2.362* -2.483*** -0.085 -
(1.288) (1.328) (1.367) (0.782) (0.927)
o0-o1 cut -7.553*** - - - - -
(1.545)
o1-o2 cut -3.437*** -3.273*** -3.521*** -5.774*** - -
(1.511) (1.549) (1.834) (1.030)
o2-o3 cut -1.145 -1.955 -2.171* -3.750*** -4.434*** -
(0.950) (1.390) (1.661) (0.891) (0.679)
o3-o4 cut - 1.921*** 2.557*** 2.174*** 1.054 -1.231
(0.766) (0.855) (0.804) (0.922) (1.212)
o4-o5 cut - - - - 2.578*** 0.783
(0.972) (1.100)
observations 1393 1134 1027 936 801 626
number of categories 4 4 4 4 4 3
pseudo-R2 0.318 0.213 0.254 0.275 0.209 0.221
2 37.40 69.61 60.15 100.9 137.7 33.91
Coecient estimates reported with standard errors clustered by USNA class year in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
25Table 10: Predicted probabilities of rank
(conditional on command experience)
command year 8 rank year 15 rank
experience o-1 o-2 o-3 o-4 o-2 o-3 o-4 o-5
0 years 0.037 0.088 0.748 0.128 0.012 0.730 0.188 0.071
1 year 0.008 0.021 0.564 0.407 0.009 0.674 0.225 0.092
2 years 0.002 0.005 0.231 0.763 0.007 0.612 0.263 0.119
3 years - - - - 0.005 0.544 0.299 0.152
4 years - - - - 0.004 0.474 0.330 0.193
5 years - - - - 0.003 0.404 0.352 0.241
6 Conclusion
This paper is an empirical study of an industry struggling with technological transition
amidst a technologically dynamic economy. We consider two broadly-dened types of skills
- traditional skills (such as seamanship and navigation, which were industry specic) and
modern skills (such as engineering, which were increasingly becoming applicable to more
and more industries). If technical progress was \engineering-biased" (as arguably was the
case during the second Industrial Revolution), an industry would need to train and retain
its engineer labor pool in order to eectively modernize. In this sense the Navy was not
particularly good at modernization. The technically-gifted corps entered separate career
paths and promotion tournaments that earned a wage premium early on, but these premia
deteriorated as careers stagnated due to the lack of promotion opportunities. Line ocers
(a.k.a. less engineer-oriented positions) on the other hand were on a more meritocratic path;
those with higher orders of merit or with some early command experience were promoted
earlier and were \fast-tracked." The result was that the Navy retained those with traditional
naval skills, and lost those with engineer skills. Such an industry would likely suer delays
in its technological transition.
We can induce some broader lessons from this. Why some industries stagnate (or outright
die) while others thrive is an important subject of economic study. Many industries have
traditional and modern skilled workers coexisting. Wage and promotion rigidities mean that
often wages will often not equal marginal products - in such an environment modern-skill
biased technical change can induce an exodus of modern-skilled workers. Here we suggest
that industries that do not adequately reward those with modern skills and instead reward
those with traditional skills may lose those modern skills and thus fail to modernize. This
paper suggests that insights from the personnel economics literature (Lazear and Oyer 2009)
can help us further understand industrial and technological history.
This also echoes the \appropriate technology" literature (Basu and Weil 1998, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti 2001) that suggests that you need the proper human capital in place before
26you can adopt a new technology. One could thus view the Amalgamation Act of 1899 as the
Navy's belated admission that they had put the cart before the horse - they had attempted
to modernize the eet without an adequately skilled workforce. By this line of reasoning,
training the entire ocer corps in the requisite technical skills allowed the Navy to regain
its technological superiority during the 20th century.
References
Acemoglu, Daron. 1998.\Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical
Change and Wage Inequality." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113: 1055-1089.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2001. \Productivity Dierences." Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics. 116: 563-606.
Acemoglu, Daron. 2002. \Directed Technical Change." Review of Economic Studies. 69:
781-810.
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. 1998. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Albion, Robert G. 1980. Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press.
Aldrich, Terry M. 1970. \Rates of Return Earned on Investment in Formal Technical Ed-
ucation in the Ante-Bellum American Economy." Journal of Economic History. 30:
251-55.
Barnaby, Kenneth C. (editor) 1960. The Institution of Naval Architects, 1860-1960: An
Historical Survey of the Institution's Transactions and Activities over 100 Years. London:
Royal Institution of Naval Architects in association with Allen and Unwin.
Bartel, Ann, and Frank Lichtenberg. 1987. \The Comparative Advantage of Educated
Workers in Implementing New Technologies." Review of Economics and Statistics. 69:
1-11.
Basu, Susanto, and David N. Weil. 1998. \Appropriate Technology and Growth." Quarterly
Journal of Economics. 113: 1025-1054.
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy. 2007. \Education and Consumption: The Eects of
Education in the Household Compared to the Marketplace." Journal of Human Capital.
1: 9{35.
Bennett, Frank M. 1896. The Steam Navy of the United States - A History of the Growth of
the Steam Vessel of War in the Navy, and of the Naval Engineer Corps. Pittsburgh, Pa:
Warren and Co. Publishers.
Bernhardt, D. 1995. \Strategic Promotion and Compensation." Review of Economic Studies.
62: 315{339.
Brennan, Georey, and Philip Pettit. 2004. The Economy of Esteem. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Brown, F.H. Phelps and Margaret H. Browne. 1968. A Century of Pay. London: McMillan
and Co.
Buhl, Lance C. 1974. \Marines and Machines: Resistance to Technological Change in the
American Navy, 1865-1869." Journal of American History 59: 703{27.
Calvert, Monte A. 1967. The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910: Professional
27Cultures in Conict. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Carlyle, Thomas. 1843. Past and Present.
Coletta, Paolo E. 1987. A Survey of U.S. Naval Aairs, 1865-1917. London: University
Press of America.
Davis, Lance E., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2006. Naval blockades in peace and war : an
economic history since 1750. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frank, Robert H. 1985. Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Galor, Oded. 2009. Unied Growth Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Galor, Oded, and Andrew Mountford. 2008. \Trading Population for Productivity: Theory
and Evidence." Review of Economic Studies. 75: 1143-1179.
Galor, Oded and David Weil. 2000. \Population, Technology, and Growth: From the
Malthusian Regime to the Demographic Transition and Beyond." American Economic
Review 90: 806-828.
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman. 1999. \A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside
Firms." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114: 1321{1358.
Glaser, Darrell J. and Ahmed S. Rahman. 2010. \Skilled Labor Job Mobility during the
Second Industrial Revolution." USNA Department of Economics working paper.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence Katz. 1998. \The Origins of Technology-Skill Complemen-
tarity." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113: 693-732.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence Katz. 2000. \Education and Income in the Early Twentieth
Century: Evidence from the Prairies." Journal of Economic History. 60: 782-818.
Goldstone, Jack A. forthcoming. The Rise of the West 1500-1850: Entrepreneurship, Cul-
ture, and the Birth of Modern Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Greif, Avner. 2005. Institutions: Theory and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Griliches, Zvi. 1959. \Capital-Skill Complementarity." Review of Economics and Statistics,
51: 465-468.
Heckman, James. 1976. \Sample Selection Bias as a Specication Error." Econometrica,
47: 153-161.
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. 2001. Introduction to Technology and Naval Combat in the Twen-
tieth Century and Beyond. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers.
Karsten, Peter. 1972. The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emer-
gence of Modern American Navalism. New York: The Free Press.
Krueger, Dirk, and Krishna B. Kumar. 2004. \Skill Specic Rather Than General Education:
A Reason for US-Europe Growth Dierences?" Journal of Economic Growth. 9: 167{207.
Krusell, Per, Lee Ohanian, Victor Rios-Rull, and Giovanni Violante. 2000. \Capital-Skill
Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis." Econometrica 68: 1029-
53.
Lazear, Edward P. and Paul Oyer. 2009. \Personnel Economics." in Handbook of Organi-
zational Economics. Robert Gibbons and D. John Roberts, eds. Princeton University
Press.
Lazear, Edward P. and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. \Rank Order Tournaments as Optimum
Contracts." Journal of Political Economy. 89: 841{864.
28McBride, William M. 1992. \Strategic Determinism in Technology Selection: The Electric
Battleship nd US Naval-Industrial Relations." Technology and Culture. 33: 248{77.
McBride, William M. 2000. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945.
Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mokyr, Joel, and the American Council of Learned Societies. 1990. The Lever of Riches.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Mokyr, Joel. 2002. The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mokyr, Joel. 2005. \The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth." Journal of
Economic History. 65: 285-351.
Morison, Elting. 1966. Men, Machines, and Modern Times. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nelson, Richard R., and Edmund S. Phelps. \Investment in Humans, Technological Diu-
sion, and Economic Growth." The American Economic Review. 56: 69{75.
North, Douglass C. 2004. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
O'Rouke, Kevin, Ahmed S. Rahman and Alan M. Taylor. 2008. \Luddites and the Demo-
graphic Transition." NBER Working Paper no. 14484.
Roberts, William H. 2002. Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization.
Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Scott, William. 1986. The Navy in the Doldrums: The Inuence of Politics and Technol-
ogy on the Decline and Rejuvenation of the American Fleet, 1866-1886. Unpublished
manuscript.
Smith, Edgar C. 1937. A Short History of Naval and Marine Engineering. Cambridge:
University Press.
Sweetman, Jack. 1979. The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History. Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press.
Sweetman, Jack. 1984. American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press.
Welch, Fins. \Education in Production." Journal of Political Economy. 101: 443{72.




















































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
 
 
Class of 1860 
Class of 1865 
Class of 1870 
Class of 1875 
Class of 1880 
Class of 1885 









Dollars  Class of 1868 
Class of 1872
Class of 1876
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